runc container escape via "masked path" abuse due to mount race conditions
opencontainers runc
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/opencontainers/runc Go |
|
|
opencontainers runc
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/opencontainers/runc Go |
|
|
runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7 and below, 1.3.0-rc.1 through 1.3.1, 1.4.0-rc.1 and 1.4.0-rc.2 files, runc would not perform sufficient verification that the source of the bind-mount (i.e., the container's /dev/null) was actually a real /dev/null inode when using the container's /dev/null to mask. This exposes two methods of attack: an arbitrary mount gadget, leading to host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a bypassing of maskedPaths. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3 and 1.4.0-rc.3.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
runc does not sufficiently verify that a container’s /dev/null is a real /dev/null inode when using it as a bind-mount source for masking. This can enable host information disclosure, host denial of service, container escape, or a maskedPaths bypass. The input does not specify whether exploitation requires network access, authentication, or user interaction.
Check deployments using github.com/opencontainers/runc versions below 1.2.8, 1.3.0-rc.1 through versions below 1.3.3, or 1.4.0-rc.1 through versions below 1.4.0-rc.3.