Path Traversal via Symbolic Links in run-llama/llama_index
run-llama/llama_index
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| llama-index-readers-obsidian PyPI |
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| llama-index PyPI |
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run-llama/llama_index
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| llama-index-readers-obsidian PyPI |
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| llama-index PyPI |
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A vulnerability in the `ObsidianReader` class of the run-llama/llama_index repository, versions 0.12.23 to 0.12.28, allows for arbitrary file read through symbolic links. The `ObsidianReader` fails to resolve symlinks to their real paths and does not validate whether the resolved paths lie within the intended directory. This flaw enables attackers to place symlinks pointing to files outside the vault directory, which are then processed as valid Markdown files, potentially exposing sensitive information.
From the CVE record · @huntr_ai
ObsidianReader does not resolve and validate symbolic links before processing Markdown files. An attacker who can place a symlink in a vault can point it to a file outside the vault, which the reader may process and expose.
Check installations of PyPI llama-index-readers-obsidian below 0.5.1 and llama-index from 0.12.23 up to but not including 0.12.28.