vlan: enforce underlying device type
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 22bedad3ce112d5ca1eaf043d4990fa2ed698c87 · < 30e8aee77899173a82ae5ed89f536c096f20aaeb| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: enforce underlying device type
Currently, VLAN devices can be created on top of non-ethernet devices.
Besides the fact that it doesn't make much sense, this also causes a bug which leaks the address of a kernel function to usermode.
When creating a VLAN device, we initialize GARP (garp_init_applicant) and MRP (mrp_init_applicant) for the underlying device.
As part of the initialization process, we add the multicast address of each applicant to the underlying device, by calling dev_mc_add.
__dev_mc_add uses dev->addr_len to determine the length of the new multicast address.
This causes an out-of-bounds read if dev->addr_len is greater than 6, since the multicast addresses provided by GARP and MRP are only 6 bytes long.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel allows a VLAN device to be created on a non-Ethernet device whose address length exceeds six bytes, causing an out-of-bounds read during GARP and MRP initialization. A local user who can create such a VLAN device can expose a kernel function address to user space. No network attack path or additional user interaction is described.
Engineers running Linux kernels that allow VLAN devices on non-Ethernet devices should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions were not specified.