bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.6.906.12.96.13In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: consider that tail calls invalidate packet pointers
Tail-called programs could execute any of the helpers that invalidate packet pointers. Hence, conservatively assume that each tail call invalidates packet pointers.
Making the change in bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data() automatically makes use of check_cfg() logic that computes 'changes_pkt_data' effect for global sub-programs, such that the following program could be rejected:
int tail_call(struct __sk_buff *sk) { bpf_tail_call_static(sk, &jmp_table, 0); return 0; }
SEC("tc") int not_safe(struct __sk_buff *sk) { int *p = (void *)(long)sk->data; ... make p valid ... tail_call(sk); *p = 42; /* this is unsafe */ ... }
The tc_bpf2bpf.c:subprog_tc() needs change: mark it as a function that can invalidate packet pointers. Otherwise, it can't be freplaced with tailcall_freplace.c:entry_freplace() that does a tail call.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s BPF verifier did not account for tail calls invalidating packet pointers. A BPF program could therefore use a packet pointer after a tail-called program invalidated it. The input does not specify what access an attacker needs to run such a program or whether user interaction is required.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected and fixed versions are not specified in the input.