io_uring: prevent reg-wait speculations
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: prevent reg-wait speculations
With *ENTER_EXT_ARG_REG instead of passing a user pointer with arguments for the waiting loop the user can specify an offset into a pre-mapped region of memory, in which case the [offset, offset + sizeof(io_uring_reg_wait)) will be intepreted as the argument.
As we address a kernel array using a user given index, it'd be a subject to speculation type of exploits. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent that. Make sure to pass not the full region size but truncate by the maximum offset allowed considering the structure size.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s io_uring registered-wait path uses a user-supplied offset to index a kernel array. Without speculation protection, this access could be subject to speculation-based attacks when a caller uses ENTER_EXT_ARG_REG. The input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected io_uring code should check their versions; no affected versions are specified.