cap-std doesn't fully sandbox all the Windows device filenames
bytecodealliance cap-std
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| cap-std crates.io |
|
|
| cap-async-std crates.io |
|
|
| cap-primitives crates.io |
bytecodealliance cap-std
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| cap-std crates.io |
|
|
| cap-async-std crates.io |
|
|
| cap-primitives crates.io |
< 3.4.1≥ 0.0.0-0 · < 3.4.1
|
The cap-std project is organized around the eponymous `cap-std` crate, and develops libraries to make it easy to write capability-based code. cap-std's filesystem sandbox implementation on Windows blocks access to special device filenames such as "COM1", "COM2", "LPT0", "LPT1", and so on, however it did not block access to the special device filenames which use superscript digits, such as "COM¹", "COM²", "LPT⁰", "LPT¹", and so on. Untrusted filesystem paths could bypass the sandbox and access devices through those special device filenames with superscript digits, and through them provide access peripheral devices connected to the computer, or network resources mapped to those devices. This can include modems, printers, network printers, and any other device connected to a serial or parallel port, including emulated USB serial ports. The bug is fixed in #371, which is published in cap-primitives 3.4.1, cap-std 3.4.1, and cap-async-std 3.4.1. There are no known workarounds for this issue. Affected Windows users are recommended to upgrade.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
The cap-std filesystem sandbox on Windows fails to block special device filenames containing superscript digits. If an application processes untrusted filesystem paths, an attacker can use those names to bypass the sandbox and access connected devices or resources mapped to them. The input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running cap-std, cap-async-std, or cap-primitives versions before 3.4.1 on Windows should check their dependencies.