x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.6.596.11.66.12In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases
Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable.
Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST, or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time, otherwise keep LAM disabled.
There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently nobody is affected by this issue.
[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf [2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
[ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a transient-execution weakness that may be exploitable when Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is not enabled. The input does not specify access or authentication requirements, and says no processors on the market currently support LAM, so nobody is currently affected.
Engineers running Linux kernels on systems that may support LAM should check their kernel vendor's guidance; affected versions are not specified.