drm/amd/display: Avoid race between dcn10_set_drr() and dc_state_destruct()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Avoid race between dcn10_set_drr() and dc_state_destruct()
dc_state_destruct() nulls the resource context of the DC state. The pipe context passed to dcn10_set_drr() is a member of this resource context.
If dc_state_destruct() is called parallel to the IRQ processing (which calls dcn10_set_drr() at some point), we can end up using already nulled function callback fields of struct stream_resource.
The logic in dcn10_set_drr() already tries to avoid this, by checking tg against NULL. But if the nulling happens exactly after the NULL check and before the next access, then we get a race.
Avoid this by copying tg first to a local variable, and then use this variable for all the operations. This should work, as long as nobody frees the resource pool where the timing generators live.
(cherry picked from commit a3cc326a43bdc48fbdf53443e1027a03e309b643)
From the CVE record · Linux
A race between AMD display state destruction and IRQ processing can cause the Linux kernel to access a callback field after it has been nulled. The input does not specify whether an attacker can trigger the race, or whether network access, authentication, or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the AMD display driver should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.