selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 18032ca062e621e15683cb61c066ef3dc5414a7b · < 76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook
Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled.
The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states:
* This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks.
nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do.
Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s SELinux and Smack inode_setsecctx hook can bypass permission checks when changing file security labels. A root user on an NFS client can change labels on files exported by an NFS server with root squashing enabled.
Administrators running Linux kernel NFS servers that export filesystems with root squashing enabled should check their deployments; affected versions were not specified.