bpf: Avoid uninitialized value in BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ ee26dade0e3bcd8a34ae7520e373fb69365fce7a · < 009367099eb61a4fc2af44d4eb06b6b4de7de6db| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Avoid uninitialized value in BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD
[Changes from V1: - Use a default branch in the switch statement to initialize `val'.]
GCC warns that `val' may be used uninitialized in the BPF_CRE_READ_BITFIELD macro, defined in bpf_core_read.h as:
[...] unsigned long long val; \ [...] \ switch (__CORE_RELO(s, field, BYTE_SIZE)) { \ case 1: val = *(const unsigned char *)p; break; \ case 2: val = *(const unsigned short *)p; break; \ case 4: val = *(const unsigned int *)p; break; \ case 8: val = *(const unsigned long long *)p; break; \ } \ [...] val; \ } \
This patch adds a default entry in the switch statement that sets `val' to zero in order to avoid the warning, and random values to be used in case __builtin_preserve_field_info returns unexpected values for BPF_FIELD_BYTE_SIZE.
Tested in bpf-next master. No regressions.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s BPF_CORE_READ_BITFIELD macro can use an uninitialized value if field-size information returns an unexpected value. The input does not describe an attacker-controlled path, an exploit outcome, or whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their builds; affected versions were not provided.