Revert "mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again"
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ ec18ec230301583395576915d274b407743d8f6c · < f6620df12cb6bdcad671d269debbb23573502f9d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again"
Patch series "mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling".
Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into 32-bits. This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for more details).
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.
The commit is broken in several ways. Firstly, the removed (u64) cast from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh >= 1<<32 (which is actually common - the default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this). Secondly, the div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs. We have div64_ul() in case we want to be safe & cheap. Thirdly, if dirty thresholds are larger than 1<<32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one possible overflow is just moot.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel dirty throttling can encounter a multiplication overflow on 32-bit architectures when dirty thresholds are high enough; the default settings with 4 GB of RAM can trigger it. The input does not describe an attacker-controlled exploit or specify access, authentication, or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels on 32-bit architectures should check whether their kernel is affected; affected versions are not specified.