crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key
private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first.
Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s ECDH code can retain part of a previous private key when a caller-supplied or newly generated replacement key is shorter. The input does not establish whether an attacker can access that material or specify any network, authentication, or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected ECDH code should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified in the input.