netfilter: complete validation of user input
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 0c83842df40f86e529db6842231154772c20edcc · < 65acf6e0501ac8880a4f73980d01b5d27648b956| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: complete validation of user input
In my recent commit, I missed that do_replace() handlers use copy_from_sockptr() (which I fixed), followed by unsafe copy_from_sockptr_offset() calls.
In all functions, we can perform the @optlen validation before even calling xt_alloc_table_info() with the following check:
if ((u64)optlen < (u64)tmp.size + sizeof(tmp)) return -EINVAL;
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel netfilter do_replace() handlers do not fully validate user-supplied input length before calling copy_from_sockptr_offset(). Malformed input can reach those unsafe calls; the description does not specify an exploit outcome, access requirements, or whether user interaction is needed.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their installations; affected versions were not provided.