l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 9d4c75800f61e5d75c1659ba201b6c0c7ead3070 · < 804bd8650a3a2bf3432375f8c97d5049d845ce56| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
l2tp: pass correct message length to ip6_append_data
l2tp_ip6_sendmsg needs to avoid accounting for the transport header twice when splicing more data into an already partially-occupied skbuff.
To manage this, we check whether the skbuff contains data using skb_queue_empty when deciding how much data to append using ip6_append_data.
However, the code which performed the calculation was incorrect:
ulen = len + skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue) ? transhdrlen : 0;
...due to C operator precedence, this ends up setting ulen to transhdrlen for messages with a non-zero length, which results in corrupted packets on the wire.
Add parentheses to correct the calculation in line with the original intent.
From the CVE record · Linux
A length-calculation error in the Linux kernel’s L2TP IPv6 send path can corrupt packets when more data is spliced into a partially occupied socket buffer. The input does not specify an attacker, access requirements, or user interaction.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified in the input.