arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: entry: fix ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD
Currently the ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround isn't quite right, as it is supposed to be applied after the last explicit memory access, but is immediately followed by an LDR.
The ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_UNPRIV_LOAD workaround is used to handle Cortex-A520 erratum 2966298 and Cortex-A510 erratum 3117295, which are described in:
* https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN2444153/0600/?lang=en * https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1873361/1600/?lang=en
In both cases the workaround is described as:
| If pagetable isolation is disabled, the context switch logic in the | kernel can be updated to execute the following sequence on affected | cores before exiting to EL0, and after all explicit memory accesses: | | 1. A non-shareable TLBI to any context and/or address, including | unused contexts or addresses, such as a `TLBI VALE1 Xzr`. | | 2. A DSB NSH to guarantee completion of the TLBI.
The important part being that the TLBI+DSB must be placed "after all explicit memory accesses".
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s arm64 entry code places a speculative unprivileged load workaround before, rather than after, the last explicit memory access. This can leave affected Cortex-A520 and Cortex-A510 cores without the intended protection when page-table isolation is disabled; the input does not specify an attack path, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels on affected Cortex-A520 or Cortex-A510 cores should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not listed in the input.