accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: Clean up integer overflow checking in map_user_pages()
The encode_dma() function has some validation on in_trans->size but it would be more clear to move those checks to find_and_map_user_pages().
The encode_dma() had two checks:
if (in_trans->addr + in_trans->size < in_trans->addr || !in_trans->size) return -EINVAL;
The in_trans->addr variable is the starting address. The in_trans->size variable is the total size of the transfer. The transfer can occur in parts and the resources->xferred_dma_size tracks how many bytes we have already transferred.
This patch introduces a new variable "remaining" which represents the amount we want to transfer (in_trans->size) minus the amount we have already transferred (resources->xferred_dma_size).
I have modified the check for if in_trans->size is zero to instead check if in_trans->size is less than resources->xferred_dma_size. If we have already transferred more bytes than in_trans->size then there are negative bytes remaining which doesn't make sense. If there are zero bytes remaining to be copied, just return success.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s accel/qaic driver had insufficient integer-overflow and transfer-size checks when mapping user pages, including a size-truncation concern on 32-bit systems. The input does not establish what an attacker could achieve or whether exploitation requires local access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the accel/qaic driver should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.