blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1b2628397058ebce7277480960b29c788138de90 · < 5c7cb94452901a93e90c2230632e2c12a681bc92| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust
If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a bug) or that ->keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.
However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value of blk_crypto_evict_key().
These two assumptions don't match, and the result is that there can be a use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn't* happen; we're just talking about what happens if they do anyway.)
Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the keyslot management structures even on failure.
Also improve some comments.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's blk-crypto key eviction can leave a freed key linked in keyslot management structures if the key is still in use or keyslot eviction fails. This can cause a use-after-free when keys are reprogrammed. The input does not specify how an attacker could trigger the errors or whether access or user interaction is required.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.