start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.1.1896.4.46.5In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
start_kernel: Add __no_stack_protector function attribute
Back during the discussion of commit a9a3ed1eff36 ("x86: Fix early boot crash on gcc-10, third try") we discussed the need for a function attribute to control the omission of stack protectors on a per-function basis; at the time Clang had support for no_stack_protector but GCC did not. This was fixed in gcc-11. Now that the function attribute is available, let's start using it.
Callers of boot_init_stack_canary need to use this function attribute unless they're compiled with -fno-stack-protector, otherwise the canary stored in the stack slot of the caller will differ upon the call to boot_init_stack_canary. This will lead to a call to __stack_chk_fail() then panic.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel callers of boot_init_stack_canary can trigger a boot panic if they use stack protection without the __no_stack_protector attribute. The caller’s saved canary then differs after the call, invoking __stack_chk_fail(). The input does not describe an attacker, authentication requirement, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels whose boot_init_stack_canary callers use stack protection should check their builds; affected versions are not specified.