netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 2bc780499aa33311ec0f3e42624dfaa7be0ade5e · < 8c0980493beed3a80d6329c44ab293dc8c032927| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: dccp: copy entire header to stack buffer, not just basic one
Eric Dumazet says: nf_conntrack_dccp_packet() has an unique:
dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, dataoff, sizeof(_dh), &_dh);
And nothing more is 'pulled' from the packet, depending on the content. dh->dccph_doff, and/or dh->dccph_x ...) So dccp_ack_seq() is happily reading stuff past the _dh buffer.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nf_conntrack_dccp_packet+0x1134/0x11c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff000128f66e0c by task syz-executor.2/29371 [..]
Fix this by increasing the stack buffer to also include room for the extra sequence numbers and all the known dccp packet type headers, then pull again after the initial validation of the basic header.
While at it, mark packets invalid that lack 48bit sequence bit but where RFC says the type MUST use them.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel DCCP connection tracking can read beyond a stack buffer when processing certain DCCP packet headers. An attacker who can get such a packet processed by the affected code may trigger the out-of-bounds read. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with DCCP connection tracking should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.