Validation of SignedInfo
simplesamlphp xml-security
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| simplesamlphp/xml-security Packagist |
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| simplesamlphp/saml2 Packagist |
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simplesamlphp xml-security
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| simplesamlphp/xml-security Packagist |
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| simplesamlphp/saml2 Packagist |
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xml-security is a library that implements XML signatures and encryption. Validation of an XML signature requires verification that the hash value of the related XML-document matches a specific DigestValue-value, but also that the cryptographic signature on the SignedInfo-tree (the one that contains the DigestValue) verifies and matches a trusted public key. If an attacker somehow (i.e. by exploiting a bug in PHP's canonicalization function) manages to manipulate the canonicalized version's DigestValue, it would be possible to forge the signature. This issue has been patched in version 1.6.12 and 5.0.0-alpha.13.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
XML signature validation in xml-security can be bypassed if an attacker can manipulate the canonicalized DigestValue, for example by exploiting a bug in PHP's canonicalization function. This could allow the attacker to forge a signature; the input does not specify network or local access, authentication requirements, or user interaction.
Check installations using Packagist simplesamlphp/xml-security versions >=1.6.11 and <1.6.12, or simplesamlphp/saml2 versions >=5.0.0-alpha.12 and <5.0.0-alpha.13.