Insecure parsing of Windows paths with a \??\ prefix in path/filepath
Go standard library path/filepath · Go standard library internal/safefilepath
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| stdlib Go |
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Go standard library path/filepath · Go standard library internal/safefilepath
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| stdlib Go |
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The filepath package does not recognize paths with a \??\ prefix as special. On Windows, a path beginning with \??\ is a Root Local Device path equivalent to a path beginning with \\?\. Paths with a \??\ prefix may be used to access arbitrary locations on the system. For example, the path \??\c:\x is equivalent to the more common path c:\x. Before fix, Clean could convert a rooted path such as \a\..\??\b into the root local device path \??\b. Clean will now convert this to .\??\b. Similarly, Join(\, ??, b) could convert a seemingly innocent sequence of path elements into the root local device path \??\b. Join will now convert this to \.\??\b. In addition, with fix, IsAbs now correctly reports paths beginning with \??\ as absolute, and VolumeName correctly reports the \??\ prefix as a volume name. UPDATE: Go 1.20.11 and Go 1.21.4 inadvertently changed the definition of the volume name in Windows paths starting with \?, resulting in filepath.Clean(\?\c:) returning \?\c: rather than \?\c:\ (among other effects). The previous behavior has been restored.
From the CVE record · Go
On Windows, Go's filepath package did not recognize paths beginning with \??\ as special. When an application processes attacker-controlled paths, Clean or Join could turn path input into a Root Local Device path that accesses arbitrary locations on the system. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Go standard library path/filepath or internal/safefilepath in Go versions before 1.20.12 on the 1.20 line or before 1.21.5 on the 1.21 line should check their deployments.