Rootfs Not Protected
LF-Edge, Zededa EVE OS
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub Go |
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| github.com/lf-edge/eve Go |
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LF-Edge, Zededa EVE OS
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub Go |
|
|
| github.com/lf-edge/eve Go |
|
|
In EVE OS, the “measured boot” mechanism prevents a compromised device from accessing the encrypted data located in the vault.
As per the “measured boot” design, the PCR values calculated at different stages of the boot process will change if any of their respective parts are changed.
This includes, among other things, the configuration of the bios, grub, the kernel cmdline, initrd, and more.
However, this mechanism does not validate the entire rootfs, so an attacker can edit the filesystem and gain control over the system.
As the default filesystem used by EVE OS is squashfs, this is somewhat harder than an ext4, which is easily changeable.
This will not stop an attacker, as an attacker can repackage the squashfs with their changes in it and replace the partition altogether.
This can also be done directly on the device, as the “003-storage-init” container contains the “mksquashfs” and “unsquashfs” binaries (with the corresponding libs).
From the CVE record · ASRG
EVE OS measured boot does not validate the entire root filesystem. An attacker who can modify the filesystem or replace its partition can gain full control of the device and access the vault without changing the measured PCR values. The input does not specify whether authentication is required.
Engineers running EVE OS or using Go packages github.com/lf-edge/eve and github.com/lf-edge/eve/pkg/grub at versions before 0.0.0-20220708121648-5fef4d92e758 should check.