kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ ab7ac4eb9832e32a09f4e8042705484d2fb0aad3 · < bf92e54597d842da127c59833b365d6faeeaf020| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kcm: close race conditions on sk_receive_queue
sk->sk_receive_queue is protected by skb queue lock, but for KCM sockets its RX path takes mux->rx_lock to protect more than just skb queue. However, kcm_recvmsg() still only grabs the skb queue lock, so race conditions still exist.
We can teach kcm_recvmsg() to grab mux->rx_lock too but this would introduce a potential performance regression as struct kcm_mux can be shared by multiple KCM sockets.
So we have to enforce skb queue lock in requeue_rx_msgs() and handle skb peek case carefully in kcm_wait_data(). Fortunately, skb_recv_datagram() already handles it nicely and is widely used by other sockets, we can just switch to skb_recv_datagram() after getting rid of the unnecessary sock lock in kcm_recvmsg() and kcm_splice_read(). Side note: SOCK_DONE is not used by KCM sockets, so it is safe to get rid of this check too.
I ran the original syzbot reproducer for 30 min without seeing any issue.
From the CVE record · Linux
Linux kernel KCM sockets have race conditions in their receive queue because parts of the receive path use different locks. The input does not specify what an attacker could achieve or whether exploitation requires local access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with KCM socket support should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.