Node address isn't always verified when proxying
Kubernetes
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes Go |
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Kubernetes
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes Go |
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| k8s.io/kubernetes Go |
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Users may have access to secure endpoints in the control plane network. Kubernetes clusters are only affected if an untrusted user can modify Node objects and send proxy requests to them. Kubernetes supports node proxying, which allows clients of kube-apiserver to access endpoints of a Kubelet to establish connections to Pods, retrieve container logs, and more. While Kubernetes already validates the proxying address for Nodes, a bug in kube-apiserver made it possible to bypass this validation. Bypassing this validation could allow authenticated requests destined for Nodes to to the API server's private network.
From the CVE record · kubernetes
A kube-apiserver bug allows users to bypass address validation for Node proxy requests. In clusters where an untrusted user can modify Node objects and send proxy requests to them, that user could direct authenticated requests intended for Nodes to endpoints on the API server's private control-plane network.
Operators running Kubernetes 1.22.0–1.22.15, 1.23.0–1.23.13, 1.24.0–1.24.7, or 1.25.0–1.25.3 should check their clusters.