drm/edid: In connector_bad_edid() cap num_of_ext by num_blocks read
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
5.10.755.14.145.15In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/edid: In connector_bad_edid() cap num_of_ext by num_blocks read
In commit e11f5bd8228f ("drm: Add support for DP 1.4 Compliance edid corruption test") the function connector_bad_edid() started assuming that the memory for the EDID passed to it was big enough to hold `edid[0x7e] + 1` blocks of data (1 extra for the base block). It completely ignored the fact that the function was passed `num_blocks` which indicated how much memory had been allocated for the EDID.
Let's fix this by adding a bounds check.
This is important for handling the case where there's an error in the first block of the EDID. In that case we will call connector_bad_edid() without having re-allocated memory based on `edid[0x7e]`.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s connector_bad_edid() function could read beyond the allocated EDID buffer because it trusted the extension-block count instead of the number of blocks read. This can occur when the first EDID block has an error. The input does not specify an attacker path, authentication requirement, or user interaction.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected versions are not specified in the input.