sched/fair: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in load_balance()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Fix shift-out-of-bounds in load_balance()
Syzbot reported a handful of occurrences where an sd->nr_balance_failed can grow to much higher values than one would expect.
A successful load_balance() resets it to 0; a failed one increments it. Once it gets to sd->cache_nice_tries + 3, this *should* trigger an active balance, which will either set it to sd->cache_nice_tries+1 or reset it to 0. However, in case the to-be-active-balanced task is not allowed to run on env->dst_cpu, then the increment is done without any further modification.
This could then be repeated ad nauseam, and would explain the absurdly high values reported by syzbot (86, 149). VincentG noted there is value in letting sd->cache_nice_tries grow, so the shift itself should be fixed. That means preventing:
""" If the value of the right operand is negative or is greater than or equal to the width of the promoted left operand, the behavior is undefined. """
Thus we need to cap the shift exponent to BITS_PER_TYPE(typeof(lefthand)) - 1.
I had a look around for other similar cases via coccinelle:
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s sched/fair load_balance() can shift by an out-of-bounds amount. This can happen after repeated failed load-balancing attempts when the task cannot run on the destination CPU. The input does not establish an attacker action, authentication requirement, or user-interaction requirement.
Engineers running the Linux kernel should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.