perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/core: Fix unconditional security_locked_down() call
Currently, the lockdown state is queried unconditionally, even though its result is used only if the PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR bit is set in attr.sample_type. While that doesn't matter in case of the Lockdown LSM, it causes trouble with the SELinux's lockdown hook implementation.
SELinux implements the locked_down hook with a check whether the current task's type has the corresponding "lockdown" class permission ("integrity" or "confidentiality") allowed in the policy. This means that calling the hook when the access control decision would be ignored generates a bogus permission check and audit record.
Fix this by checking sample_type first and only calling the hook when its result would be honored.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's perf/core queries the lockdown state even when PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR is not set in an event's sample_type. With SELinux's lockdown hook, this causes a permission check and audit record even though the decision is ignored. The input does not describe an attacker action or specify network access, authentication, or user interaction requirements.
Engineers running the Linux kernel with SELinux's lockdown hook should check their affected kernel versions; none are specified in the input.