Another race in XENMAPSPACE_grant_table handling Guests are permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory
xen
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Xen xen |
| No fix yet |
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xen
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Xen xen |
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| Xen xen |
| No fix yet |
| Xen xen |
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Another race in XENMAPSPACE_grant_table handling Guests are permitted access to certain Xen-owned pages of memory. The majority of such pages remain allocated / associated with a guest for its entire lifetime. Grant table v2 status pages, however, are de-allocated when a guest switches (back) from v2 to v1. Freeing such pages requires that the hypervisor enforce that no parallel request can result in the addition of a mapping of such a page to a guest. That enforcement was missing, allowing guests to retain access to pages that were freed and perhaps re-used for other purposes. Unfortunately, when XSA-379 was being prepared, this similar issue was not noticed.
From the CVE record · XEN
Xen grant table v2 status pages can be freed while a parallel request maps them to a guest. A guest can then retain access to pages that have been freed and may be reused for other purposes. Exploitation requires a guest; the input does not specify any further authentication or user interaction.
Operators running Xen should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.