Multiple Transfer-Encoding headers misinterprets request payload
hyperium hyper
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hyper crates.io |
|
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hyperium hyper
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hyper crates.io |
|
|
hyper is an open-source HTTP library for Rust (crates.io). In hyper from version 0.12.0 and before versions 0.13.10 and 0.14.3 there is a vulnerability that can enable a request smuggling attack. The HTTP server code had a flaw that incorrectly understands some requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers to have a chunked payload, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that understands the request payload boundary differently can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks". To determine if vulnerable, all these things must be true: 1) Using hyper as an HTTP server (the client is not affected), 2) Using HTTP/1.1 (HTTP/2 does not use transfer-encoding), 3) Using a vulnerable HTTP proxy upstream to hyper. If an upstream proxy correctly rejects the illegal transfer-encoding headers, the desync attack cannot succeed. If there is no proxy upstream of hyper, hyper cannot start the desync attack, as the client will repair the headers before forwarding. This is fixed in versions 0.14.3 and 0.13.10. As a workaround one can take the following options: 1) Reject requests that contain a `transfer-encoding` header, 2) Ensure any upstream proxy handles `transfer-encoding` correctly.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
hyper’s HTTP server can incorrectly accept requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers. An attacker can cause request smuggling when hyper serves HTTP/1.1 behind an upstream proxy that interprets the request boundary differently. The hyper client and HTTP/2 are not affected.
Check applications using the crates.io hyper package in the listed affected 0.12, 0.13, or 0.14 version ranges as an HTTP/1.1 server behind an upstream proxy.