Possible request smuggling in HTTP/2 due missing validation
netty io.netty:netty-codec-http2
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| io.netty:netty-codec-http2 Maven |
|
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| org.jboss.netty:netty Maven |
| No fix yet |
| io.netty:netty Maven |
|
netty io.netty:netty-codec-http2
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| io.netty:netty-codec-http2 Maven |
|
|
| org.jboss.netty:netty Maven |
| No fix yet |
| io.netty:netty Maven |
|
| No fix yet |
Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Netty's HTTP/2 codec does not validate a Content-Length header when converting an HTTP/2 request into HTTP/1.1 objects. An attacker can smuggle a request if the application uses HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec with Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and forwards those objects to a remote HTTP/1.1 peer.
Check applications using io.netty:netty-codec-http2 versions 4.0.0 through versions before 4.1.60.Final in that configuration; the input also lists all versions of io.netty:netty and org.jboss.netty:netty as affected, with no fix listed for those packages.