Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects
oauth2-proxy
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 Go |
|
|
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy Go |
| No fix yet |
oauth2-proxy
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 Go |
|
|
| github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy Go |
| No fix yet |
OAuth2 Proxy is an open-source reverse proxy and static file server that provides authentication using Providers (Google, GitHub, and others) to validate accounts by email, domain or group. In OAuth2 Proxy before version 7.0.0, for users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect. For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for ".example.com", the intention is that subdomains of example.com are allowed. Instead, "example.com" and "badexample.com" could also match. This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards. As a workaround, one can disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
OAuth2 Proxy's whitelist domain feature can match domains that merely end like an intended domain. When that feature is enabled, an attacker could use a lookalike domain as a redirect destination. The input does not specify whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Check installations using Go package github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 before 7.0.0 or github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy at any version through 3.2.0.